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Wisecup: President’s Forum

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Some Reflections on Innovation, Problem Solving, and Original
Research

from the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) and General James Mattis (Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command) to Newport. CNO likes to talk about the advantages of students having “unstructured” time to think while at the Naval War College. Granted, there
are courses, research, conferences, and the like constantly in progress, so it’s not
completely unstructured. That said, a famous scholar of the Middle Ages, Joseph
Strayer of Princeton, liked to critique his students’ work as needing more “look1
ing out the window” time. Having in mind the million-dollar view out the windows in Newport, rain or shine, it is the idea of taking this time to think about
our profession and problems that I’d like to talk about. In his recent remarks
General Mattis made the point that we always need to know “what problem
we’re trying to solve”—good guidance for a place like Newport.
If you read the books Plan Orange or Agents of Innovation, you will find that
in the period leading up to the Second World War there was a relatively simple
process by which the fleet and the Navy’s leadership could use the intellectual
capital of the Naval War College to look at issues of importance to the Navy and
2
Marine Corps. The results took the form, for example, of “Naval War College
Suggestions” to the General Board (naval leadership and senior action group,
which lasted for just over fifty years and was disestablished in 1951). Gaming
done in Newport was predominantly tactical, but it also involved campaign
planning, trying to resolve issues that were considered problems for the Navy.
This was not just a matter of the introduction of new technologies, like naval
aviation, but of attempts to overcome the nonfortification clause of the Washington Naval Treaty, to study logistics, and to conceptualize the network of bases
that would be needed to conduct operations over vast distances. Resolving that
WE RECENTLY HAD VISITS
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latter issue led to thinking about the scale of operations needed to capture and
hold the many islands that would have to be taken in the coming war with Japan.
Another good example is the story of Naval War College faculty member Captain Joseph Mason Reeves, who as head of the Tactics Department at the height
of the controversy over battleship vulnerability in 1925 convincingly showed the
General Board that naval aviation would undoubtedly influence the outcome of
3
future sea battles. Later, in 1929, as the Navy’s first qualified aviator to become a
flag officer, Reeves participated in Fleet Problem IX, in which he “attacked” the
Panama Canal, showing in practice how to use this new capability for offense
and demonstrating that aviation could do far more than scout for the
battleships.
My point is that though the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 made the fight much more joint, and for good reason, there are still naval problems to solve. Here in Newport we are chartered to put intellectual effort
into looking for the solutions to these and other problems. Frustration breeds
innovation. To paraphrase John Boyd, “machines don’t fight wars, people do.
And they use their minds.”
It’s the “using our minds” piece that has my attention—and trying to answer
the “why” questions with a huge dose of intellectual honesty.
Sitting in my office last week, I was listening to a recording made in 1962, now
transferred to a CD, of a talk Admiral Chester Nimitz gave here at the College. I
had never heard Nimitz’s voice. He said that his preparation in Newport had given
him the intellectual wherewithal to consider the scale of operations that would
have to be accomplished in a Pacific campaign. When the time came, he already
had an idea what it would mean—for instance, he needed to expand the Navy’s officer corps by a “factor of fifteen.” That’s a huge impact. (Remember, Nimitz established one of the first six Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units, at the
University of California at Berkeley.) He went on to say that during the war he
hardly had to look at a map, as he had become familiar with the Pacific islands and
atolls during his studies in Newport in 1923, which had forced him for the first
time to consider the logistics of such a massive Pacific naval campaign.
The other aspect of the College, besides a top-flight education afforded by a
distinguished faculty and unstructured time to think, is original research, which
normally goes to the heart of “why” questions. We have that going on here in a
variety of areas. We have faculty experts in both the teaching and research ranks,
as you can see from the lineup of articles in this issue of the Naval War College
Review: “Chinese Missile Strategy,” “Maritime Information-Sharing Strategy,”
and work on tactics. There are also studies in progress on small wars, nuclear
weapons in North Korea, international law and operations in exclusive economic zones, and a variety of work concerning South Asia, cyber issues, command and control, outer space, and ballistic-missile defense. There is no staff of
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“action officers” here, only a dedicated and distinguished faculty doing work
that—at least from where I sit—matters. They examine regional issues across
the world, working to help fleet commanders, combatant commanders, and
CNO to address some current “wicked hard” issues and to anticipate future issues. The other part of this original research is student/faculty research done by
the Halsey Groups, which work on operational and regional problems, as well as
the Mahan Group, which works deterrence issues.
There is also the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL),
specializing in leadership and officer-development issues and overseeing the
Stockdale Group students. Its faculty is currently combing through three years
of original research for conclusions we might draw about how to educate and
develop our future leaders. COSL recently produced a very interesting ethics
conference and is conducting award-winning research on “Capabilities-Based
Competencies Assessment,” which could offer new ways to figure out how the
4
Navy should man, train, and equip itself. It’s an attempt to think in new ways
about how to get the right people into the right jobs in an organization as huge
as the U.S. Navy. We are working closely with the fleet on that, starting with what
type of people is needed in the Maritime Operations Centers. We’re teaming
with several organizations and will shortly be asking the numbered-fleet commanders questions about what kinds of folks they want and need to do their
work and how the system can respond to the demand. You get the picture.
This research is solid, and some of it is being done only here in Newport,
though we often work in close partnership with other parts of the Navy to ensure
we’re connected and not off in some “ivory tower”—one of the reasons we had a
small team at Carnegie Mellon in early April, for example. We’re simply looking
for the best ideas and trying to attract the best talent to come to Newport to help
us work on them, whether in uniform or civilian—we just want the best.
The final example is war gaming, which, in the United States, originated in
Newport and now comes in a variety of sizes and shapes. A lot of this work feeds
into research going on in other places or can spin off into new research efforts.
This work merits a slot in a future “President’s Forum.” For example, as this goes
to press we are in Colombia for a regional seminar, with officers from a dozen
countries, gaming scenarios for maritime domain awareness. So a combination
of teaching faculty, research faculty, and students makes up the intellectual capital we’re trying to get to the right places, whether in the Navy bureaus or in the
fleet. It’s a pretty interesting institution to be a part of, especially now.
A former President of the College, Admiral Stansfield Turner, once correctly
said, “Scholarship for its own sake is of no interest to us.” We are interested in
how research can influence policy, influence our decision making, and generally
improve how the naval services work to serve the nation. So I see one of my main
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duties as helping get the best of our intellectual efforts in front of the right folks
and bringing them to bear in the right places in our own institutions, where they
can do some good. No one up here in Newport thinks we have all the answers,
but it’s progress to be asking the right questions and then at least trying to get the
results to where they might actually make a difference. We are, after all, engaged
in the longest conflict in our history, and we owe CNO, the Navy, and the nation
our best efforts—anything less, and we might as well pack up and go home.
There are times I feel a real sense of urgency about getting to the right answers
quickly, and that is the nature of things sometimes in our nation’s capital, where
they must live with the twenty-four-hour news cycle. But the history of the Naval War College is not about quick, snappy answers; it’s about doing the work.
It’s almost a biological process, like not expecting to eat popcorn the day after
planting the seeds. War and its prevention are among the most complex activities we human beings take on. Here in Newport we are trying our best to get our
thinking as right as we can. It’s about gaining insights—sometimes inexact, even
vague, and only after painstaking analysis and gaming, followed by synthesis,
sometimes over a period of years; getting the Navy leadership to accept or reject
the research, after iterative experimentation and testing; writing up the lessons
to inform doctrine; and then building on the lessons, year after year.
The composer Benjamin Britten once said, “Composing is like driving down
a foggy road toward a house. Slowly you see more details of the house—the color
of the slates and bricks, the shape of the windows. The notes are the bricks and
the mortar of the house.” I think this is a fitting metaphor, one that aptly describes, in part, the nature of our work at the Naval War College. Our record, as a
nation, of predicting the future is not great; we are often in the fog, often get
things really wrong, and sometimes we miss indicators that are obvious in
hindsight.
That doesn’t mean we should give up trying to peer into the fog and darkness
to see the way ahead—the work is too important—but it does mean that here in
Newport, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, we should
always be prepared for surprises, that we should be thinking continually about
what the people who have to make the tough decisions for the Navy of the future
will need to do business.

JAMES P. WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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